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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY
OF AMERICA, a corporation,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.
Case No. 13836
CARNICERO DYNASTY CORPORATION,
a corporation; WENDELL L.
BUTCHER; IRENE B. BUTCHER;
CHRIS L. STANFIELD; JANIS B.
STANFIELD; BEN D. ISAAC; and
LILA 0. ISAAC,
Defendants and
Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF CASE
This is a civil action brought by plaintiff against defendants to recover moneys paid under a construction bond pursuant to
the terms of an indemnity agreement given by defendants Butcher.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The matter was tried to the court sitting without a jury,
the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, District Judge, presiding.

The

trial court found the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against
all defendants, and entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Judgment accordingly.

From said Judgment, defendants

Butcher appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the Judgment of the trial
court entered herein.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In reciting the facts in appellants1 brief, they have
abstracted testimony and drawn conclusions therefrom in a light
most favorable to their position.

The recitation of facts by

respondent will be in conformity with this Court!s pronouncement
in the case of Cheney vs. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86,
wherein the Court stated:
11

In considering the soundness of the trial
courtfs conclusion and judgment..., certain cardinal rules must be kept in mind:
That the judgment is endowed with a presumption of validity; that the party
attacking it has the burden of affirmatively showing that it is in error; and
that the evidence and all the inferences
that fairly and reasonably may be drawn
therefrom must be viewed in the light most
favorable to it.11

Wendell Butcher and his wife are the only defendants
appealing herein.

The remaining defendants, against whom judg-

ment was entered, have allowed respondents judgment to become
final.
Appellant, Wendell Butcher, was the managing director
of the Carnicero (Butcher in Spanish) Dynasty Corporation.

The officers in the corporation and principal stockholders were
his children (R-271).
its managing director.

Wendell Butcher ran the corporation as
Such a description of his position is

given for lack of a better terminology.

He admittedly was the

only one to really know what was going on in the company and
was operating the company as he saw fit, the stock ownership
however being in the names of his children.
A bond was needed before Carnicero could bid on the construction of a post office in Farmington, Utah.

Butcher

approached an insurance agent, Joseph Mills, and requested a
bid bond on the project, explaining that in the event the bid
was accepted, he would need a Labor, Materials and Performance
Bond as well.

He was the only person to ever contact the in-

surance agent concerning the bond (R-370).

He was told by the

agent that since the corporation was a new company and of
questionable financial position, indemnity would be required
from Butcher and the officers (R-361).
The trial judge questioned the agent concerning the
proposal of indemnity as follows:
"The Court: And after the corporation got
the bid, what steps were taken to get the
bond issued?
"The Witness: When he notified us that he
got the bid, we notified General Insurance
Company in Denver, and they issued me to

issue the performance, labor and material
bond.
"The Court: What, if anything, was done with
respect to the indemnity agreement?
"The Witness: When that was signed and turned
in to me, I sent it in to the company office
in Denver.
"The Court:

Did you request that agreement?

"The Witness:

No, sir, the company did.

"The Court: Do you know the means by which the
company requested that agreement?
"The Witness:

They request it on all bonds.

"The Court: How is that request transferred
to the applicant for the bond?
"The Witness:
Mr. Butcher.

Through me.

I requested it from

"The Court: Well, that was my question.
you request the indemnity agreement?
"The Witness:
it, yes.
"The Court:

Did

After the company asked me to do

Was that before the bond was issued?

"The Witness:
ours.)

Yes, sir."

(R.375-376)

(Emphasis

Butcher, in negotiating with the insurance agent concerning the bond, admitted that he was told by the agent that before
any bond could be issued on any of their jobs they might be
bidding on, he would have to submit financial statements and

indemnity agreements to the company.
ff

Qo

He testified as follows:

(by Mr. Walker). Let me ask you when
-- on or about the time you took these
indemnity agreements to the insurance
company, although you didnft sign an
application, did you discuss obtaining
bonds on either of these jobs with the
insurance company?

,f

A. With the Safeway or the Forest Service
Building?

fl

Q. Yes.

ff

A. Yes, I told Mr. Mills that that is what
we was doing, that we were trying to get
financing and we talked to -- where we
presented it on our statement to him and
told him we did not have permanent financing, that we possibly would need a completion
bond on this. And so we might as well -the company might as well submit what
applications we needed for the bonds in
case we needed bonds.

,!

Q. And did he instruct you to do anything
but get this indemnity agreement?

f,

A.

He said he would need an application which
we signed at that time, I thought, and we
would have to submit financial statements
which we did and we would have to -- being
it was a new corporation, we would have to
sign indemnitor agreements which I went
and had signed afterwards.

f,

Q. You say it was discussed with Mr. Mills at
the time the indemnity agreement --

n

A.

I told him why we needed the bonds, yes.11
(R0360-361).
(Emphasis ours.)

The agent, Joe Mills, testified that the company required

indemnity agreements to be signed on all bonds issued and more
particularly, from the individuals where their corporation was
new and credit was questionable (R0375-376).
Butcher presented the indemnity agreements to his own
children and their respective spouses for signature and returned
them to the insurance agent, Mills.

In the meantime, the agent

had prepared and delivered to Butcher the bonds requested, dating said bonds in conformity to the date of the contract with
the United States Government for the building of the post office.
The bonds were prepared by the insurance company on bond forms
provided by the United States Government and as required under
the contract.

The forms were not insurance company forms but

were U. S. Government forms, merely signed by the bonding
company and the contractor.
After approximately four months had elapsed and no indemnity agreement had been signed by Wendell Butcher or Irene
Butcher, the company requested the agent to again contact
Mr. Butcher and request that he sign and furnish it the indemnity agreement previously agreed upon.

Upon receiving this

request, Butcher then responded as promised and delivered the
signed indemnity agreement to the company after having the
same notarized.
losses began

Approximately one year thereafter, notice of

appearing on the scene.

Claims of unpaid

creditors were being forwarded to the bonding company for payment.
The insurance carrier contacted Butcher and his children
concerning their obligations and requested that they clear up
the outstanding debts if possible.

Upon receiving no financial

assurances from the defendants, the bonding company was then
required to meet with all the creditors and make arrangements
to satisfy their claims to remove liens from the building so
that the post office could commence its operations.
Suit was thereafter filed claiming payment under the
indemnity agreements.

In answering the pleadings, all but

defendants Isaac admitted the allegations of consideration for
the indemnity agreement.

In paragraph 2 of plaintifffs com-

plaint, it alleged as follows:
"That the defendants, and each of them,
applied to and received a Labor and
Materials Payment Bond and Performance
Bond Numbers 573306 from the plaintiff
insurance company ..."
And thereafter in paragraph 4 of said complaint, it stated:
"That the defendants, and each of them, in
consideration for the issuance of said
bonds, executed a General Agreement of
Indemnity indemnifying the plaintiff herein for any and all loss that it might
suffer as the result of its issuing said
bonds."

In response to the above allegations in the complaint,
defendants Isaac denied the same. As soon as receiving that
answer, counsel for respondent herein immediately deposed the
Isaacs wherein they admitted the truthfulness of the allegations and that they had, in fact, signed the indemnity agreement
laying the issue to rest at that point.
In answering the complaint on behalf of the Butchers,
the answer failed to deny any of the allegations to plaintifffs
complaint other than as stated in defendants Butchers1 answer
which set forth four defenses as follows:
"1.

That plaintiff failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted;

fl

That the plaintiff was not the real
party in interest;

"3.

That plaintifffs action was premature;
and

fl

Disputed claims to creditors who were
not entitled to payment and would become
a volunteer.11

2o

4.

No other defenses were raised by the Butchers nor did they
deny the allegations of plaintifffs complaint and more specifically,
paragraphs 2 and 4 of said complaint (R.8-9).

Shortly thereafter,

defendants amended their answer to exclude as an answering party
the defendants Isaac but again reiterated the same defenses con~
tained in the original answer (R-10).

About four or five months prior to the trial of the
case, defendants Butcher requested copies of the document in
question, namely, the Indemnity Agreement they had signed,
which were furnished to them.

Although the document bore a

date clearly visible on its face, and Wendell Butcher was
fully aware of the time when the bond was issued as he signed
the contract and bond on behalf of the corporation, there was
nevertheless no motion to amend these defendants1 answer to
allege a defense of lack of consideration nor was any ever
claimed.

It was not until after respondent rested its case

that appellants Butcher attempted to then amend their pleadings
to include a defense of lack of consideration.
The apparent difference in the time or dates, as indicated on the Indemnity Agreement of the Butchers, as compared
to the bonds came about because of the late signing of the
agreement by the Butchers although they had previously agreed
to give such indemnification.
Considerable argument is made by appellants herein (its
materiality on the issues however is unknown) that there were
several continuances in the trial of the matter which were sole
the responsibility of respondent.

Q

It is respectfully pointed

out that the last continuance of the trial setting in the
matter was granted by Judge Ernest F. Baldwin at the request
of counsel for defendants Butcher.

He contacted counsel for

the plaintiff and indicated that a continuance was desired.
At that point, counsel for plaintiff was requested to confer
with the Judge, indicating a lack of objection for a continuance and requesting the court to do so at the request of
Mr. Barker.

Since plaintiff had received a continuance from

Mr. Barker with the courtfs consent, it was felt that plaintiff was obligated to give consent.

In any event, a continuance

of the last trial setting was given by Judge Baldwin only after
insisting that Mr. Ronald Barker, counsel for the Butchers, contact Judge Baldwin personally and make the request directly
rather than by counsel for plaintiff.

Apparently, this was

done and Judge Baldwin granted the continuance.
After all the evidence had been presented to the court
by respondent, the matter was taken under advisement, including
defendants Butchers1 motion to amended their pleadings. Thereafter the court ruled in favor of the respondent herein, finding
that appellants Butcher had, in fact, signed their Indemnity
Agreement in consideration for the respondent issuing its bond$
and that respondent, in reliance upon their promise to do so,

issued the bonds although the Agreement of Indemnity had not
actually been signed until after the bonds had been delivered.
The court further found that the damages, as alleged by the
respondent, had been proven and awarded judgment accordingly
(R. 150 through 155).

From said Judgment, the Butchers take

this appealo
POINTS URGED FOR AFFIRMANCE
POINT I
APPELLANTS BUTCHER ARE LEGALLY BOUND TO INDEMNIFY THE RESPONDENT
AS FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT.
POINT II
APPELLANTS BUTCHER FAILED TO RAISE THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF CONSIDERATION IN THEIR ANSWER AND SHOULD BE PRECLUDED FROM NOW SO
DOING.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANTS BUTCHER ARE LEGALLY BOUND TO INDEMNIFY THE RESPONDENT
AS FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT.
The Butchers were told that before any bond could be
issued on the post office job, indemnity would be required from
all concerned.

Wendell Butcher presented the agreements to his

family for signature.

He returned those signed by his children

and their spouses but delayed in signing one himself.

The bonds

in the meantime were issued by the company to conform to the
contract date and were delivered subject to his promise to give

the required indemnity.

He was told of the need for the indem-

nity agreement prior to the bonds being issued and had agreed
to supply the same. About four months after the bonds had been
delivered, the bonding company then, through its agent, insisted
that Mr. and Mrs. Butcher complete their agreement by signing
the indemnification and returning it to the company.
done by the Butchers without objection.

This was

About one year later,

the project became bogged down in unpaid bills and the bonding
company was required to take over and complete the job, including payment of the unpaid bills.
At the conclusion of the respondents evidence, the
Butchers attempted to amend their pleadings by alleging lack
of consideration because of the variance in dates on the instruments.

The trial court refused to allow them to do so and

specifically found that the Butchers had promised, with the
others, to give indemnification for the issuance of the bonds
and although they did not actually sign their agreement until
after the bonds had actually been delivered, such late signing
did not invalidate their agreement.

The court further found

that there was consideration given by the insurance carrier
for issuing said bonds and that the Butchers promised to indemnify if the bonds were to issue.

The court chose to believe the testimony of the agent
that indemnification was requested prior to the issuance of
the bonds.
An indemnity agreement signed after the execution and
delivery of the bond has the same force and effect as if it
were executed at the time the bonds were issued if there was
an understanding between the parties. Where the indemnitee
and the indemnitor agree that indemnity will issue if the
company provides its bond, such agreement is binding.

See

Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland vs. 0'Bryan et al
(Kentucky), 180 Ky. 277, 202 S.W.645.

In the O'Bryan case,

the defendants agreed to provide indemnity in the event a
bond was issued.

However, the indemnity agreement was not

signed until sometime after the bond had been issued.

The

Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in what appears to be the leading case on the subject, stated:
n

We, therefore, have no difficulty in ruling
that the bond of indemnity was executed simultaneously with the bond of the surety
company, or at any rate that the bond of
indemnity, although it may not have been
finally executed and delivered until April,
1904 (several months later), was then fully
executed and delivered pursuant to an agreement, made before or at the time the bond
was made by the surety company, that the

13

bond of indemnity would be executed. It
is immaterial which of these view is
correct because if the bond of indemnity
was executed and delivered simultaneously
with the bond of the surety company, or
was afterwards executed and delivered pursuant to an agreement or arrangement made
between the surety company and the indemnitors before or at the time it signed
Blackwell's bond, there was sufficient
consideration for the execution of the bond
of indemnity. In other words, the execution
of a bond of indemnity subsequent to the
execution of the original undertaking will
have the same force and effect as if it were
executed simultaneously with the original
undertaking, if its subsequent execution was
pursuant to an arrangement or agreement,
between the indemnitee and the indemnitors,
at the time or before the indemnitee' became
bound, that there should be executed to it
a bond of indemnity." (Emphasis ours.)
See also 50 AmJur, Suretyship, Section 19, Page 914.
Therein, the author states:
"If the original contract is induced by the
promise of one of the parties that he will
obtain the signature of the person who subsequently signs a surety in pursuance of
such agreement, no new consideration is
necessary to support the latter1s undertaking. In such case, the execution of the
instrument by the surety relates back to
and takes effect the same as if it had been
coincidental with the execution by the original debtor. Often the language of the
decision is broad enough to make a promise
by the principal to procure any signer in
general, rather than some particular signer,
sufficient to remove the case from the
operation of the general rule and, of course,

no new consideration is necessary if the
signer signs in pursuance of his own
previous promise to do so." (Emphasis
ours.)
Other more recent cases following the 0'Bryan case maintain the same sound positionQ

See the case of Wagner vs.

Fireman1s Fund Insurance Company (Colorado), CCA 10th, 1965,
352 Fedo2d 410. In the Wagner case, the indemnity agreement
was not signed and delivered until at least two months after the
bonds were delivered.

The Court stated:

"The basis of liability for the judgment
against all of the appellants is an indemnity agreement which was furnished to
the surety company. This agreement was
not executed and delivered until at least
two months after the bonds had been
delivered. The primary defense was lack
of consideration in that the instrument
was not a part of the original transaction
and was not an inducement for the issuance
of the bonds0fl
The Court then stated that it was the finding of the trial
court that the defendants agreed, when they applied for the bond,
that they would issue indemnity agreements in consideration for
the company providing the bonds.

The Appellate Court thereafter

stated:
"The rule is well stated in Fidelity &
Deposit Company of Maryland vs. O'Bryan,
180 Ky. 277 .... the execution of a bond
of indemnity subsequent to the execution

of the original undertaking will have the
same force and effect as if it were executed simultaneously with the original
undertaking, if its subsequent execution
was pursuant to an arrangement or agreement, between the indemnitee and indemnitors,
at the time or before the indemnitee became
bound, that there should be executed to it
a bond of indemnity.ff
The Circuit Court further stated:
"The evidence is adequate to support the
findings that the indemnity agreement was
contemplated by the original undertaking
and did not require new consideration.11
See also the case of Engbrock vs. Federal Insurance
Company (Texas 1967), CCA 5th, 370 Fed.2d 784. In the Engbrock
case, the indemnity agreement was not signed and delivered to
the surety for over four months after the bonds were issued.
The Fifth Circuit Court stated:
,f

In the trial against Engbrock, as an individual, a question was raised in regard to an
agreement under which Engbrock was to indemnify surety for losses sustained under bonds
issued to Encon on the Eagle Lake job.
Engbrock contends that the indemnity agreement fails for lack of consideration because
he signed the agreement four months after
the bond had been issued. The trial judge
recognized this contention would have force
if the signing of the agreement had constituted a new promise by Engbrock. But, to
the contrary, the judge found that prior to
the execution of the bonds in May, 1962,
Engbrock had promised orally to execute the

indemnity agreement before or contemporaneously with the execution of the bonds.
This finding is supported by ample evidence
.... In such circumstances, the execution
of the indemnity agreement is in pursuance
and consummation of a prior arrangement
between the parties and it is not necessary
that the written promise carrying into effect
the prior oral promise to execute the writing
be supported by new or additional consideration.11
See also an annotation on the subject at 167 ALR 1203,
wherein the author states:
"Where antecedent promises to execute a
collateral or supplemental undertaking with
respect to a principal contract is made
directly by the one who becomes the undertaker, as an inducement to the execution
thereof, it is sufficient to supply the
necessary legal consideration for the
undertaking, in whatever form the promise
may be evidenced.11
The evidence is clear that by the testimony of the agent
and appellants Butcher, indemnity was to be required of Butcher
and the other persons involved with the corporation because of
the fact that the corporation was new and lacked financial
stability.

Based upon Butcher1s promise of indemnity, together

with the other defendants herein, the bonds were issued.
court so found and entered judgment accordingly.

The

Had the Butchers

not intended to give indemnity for the issuance of said bonds,
they should have so stated upon applying for the bonds. Had they

done so, undoubtedly, the bonds would have been rejected
because of the instability of the company making application.
Instead, the opposite occurred.

They not only understood that

they were required to give indemnity but Mr. Butcher obtained
the signatures of the other parties himself and he later on
also signed an indemnity agreement without objection.

Undoubtedly,

the agent was tardy in not following up the signing of the
Butcher indemnity agreement at an earlier date but such did
not invalidate the intent of the parties or their agreements.
The courtfs findings are amply supported by the evidence and
should not be disturbed.
POINT II
APPELLANTS BUTCHER FAILED TO RAISE THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF CONSIDERATION IN THEIR ANSWER AND SHOULD BE PRECLUDED FROM NOW SO
DOING.
Lack of consideration, being an affirmative defense, should
have been pleaded in the initial answer which was not done (Rule 8c,
U.R.C.P.).

Had Mr. and Mrs. Butcher honestly believed that there

was no agreement in advance of the issuance of the bonds to give
indemnification, they certainly would have informed their counsel of such information and would have refused to give indemnity
when so requested.

The court found from the evidence that

the various information concerning the date of the bonds

-I Q

and the date of the Butcher indemnity agreement was available
to them months before the matter came to trial.

In spite of

this, however, no such defense was ever raised.

Wendell

Butcher signed the contractual paper and the bond that was
prepared by the Government and therefore, had to have been
aware of the date of its execution.

He also knew that when

he finally got around to signing his own indemnity agreement,
several months had elapsed since the bond had been issued.
If it were not his intent to give indemnity in consideration
for the issuance of said bonds, he certainly was obligated to
raise such an objection rather than sign.

The court so found.

The court further found by the evidence, as testified to by
Mr. Mills and by Mr. Butcher, that indemnification was discussed
and was a prerequisite before the company would issue its bond
to this newly activated and apparently somewhat financially
unstable corporation.

The facts clearly indicate that both

Mr. Mills so testified as did Mr. Butcher.
Had it been the intention to raise such a defense, the
same should have been done when it was raised by defendants Isaac.
When they denied the indemnification agreement, immediate discovery was commenced.

After seeing their indemnity agreement

and having their memories refreshed, the Isaacs then admitted

signing the agreement.
iately.

This issue was then put to rest immed-

It was obvious that the Butchers executed the agreement

of indemnity as orally agreed upon.
Nevertheless, the Butchers requested the court to allow
an amendment of the pleadings at the conclusion of the respondent's
evidence and at a time when it was virtually impossible for the
respondent to have rebutted said evidence as it had not been an
issue in the case until that time and there was no way witnesses
could be made available.

This court correctly stated the

general principles in the case of Goeltz vs. Continental Bank &
Trust Company, 5 Utah 2d 204, 299 P.2d 832.

In this case, it

was claimed by the defendant that a motion to amend its answer
to include the defense of the Statute of Limitations should be
allowed.

The Court stated:
"Here defendant seeks leave to amend after all
the evidence is in, even though all of the
facts on which this defense is based have been
fully known by the bank since the original
certificates were deposited with it in March
of 1947 and no new evidence was discovered
during the trial which made the defense available where it had not been available under the
facts known by the bank in the first instances."

The Court then properly ruled that such an amendment should not
be permitted.
In the instant case, the insurance agent, Joe Mills,

testified that at this late date, he could not recollect all
of the details as to the documentation of the file by
correspondence, etc. as he did not have the facilities to keep
records for such a period of time.

It was also pointed out to

the court that certain people involved in the Bonding Department
of the respondent company were no longer employed by it and
their whereabouts was unknown at the conclusion of the trial.
This Court aptly presented the plaintifffs position in
its commentaries in the case of Buehner Block Company vs. Glezos,
6 Utah 2d 226, 310 P.2d 517. In interpreting the Rules of
Civil Procedure bearing upon the right to amend pleadings, this
Honorable Court stated:
"Notwithstanding all of our efforts to eliminate technicalities and liberalize procedure , we must not lose sight of the cardinal
principle that under our system of justice,
if an issue is to be tried and a partyfs
rights concluded with respect thereto, he
must have notice thereof and an opportunity
to meet it." (Emphasis ours.)
Respondent herein respectfully submits that the Court
correctly concluded that the evidence clearly indicated that the
bonding company asked for indemnification from the Butchers and
other parties of the corporation as a prerequisite to its issuing
its bonds.

The record shows, as was found by the court, that

Butcher, as did the other defendants, agreed to give this

indemnification at the time the bonds were requested.
Clearly, where a party fails to deny a material allegation of a complaint and fails to plead an affirmative defense,
it can only be interpreted by the court and the opposite party
that such is not an issue in the case and treat it accordingly.
No party to a law suit should be required to anticipate that
its opponent will move to amend his pleadings after all of the
evidence has been presented, allowing no opportunity to overcome
the allegations contained within the proposed amendment at the
conclusion of trial.

It is respectfully submitted that the

court properly so ruled.
CONCLUSION
The appellants herein have failed to make an affirmative
showing of error.

The evidence, and all inferences that fairly

and reasonably may be drawn therefrom, and viewed in a light
most favorable to the respondent, support the court's Findings
of Fact and Judgment herein and should not be disturbed.
Respectfully submitted,
BAYLE AND LAUCHNOR
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent
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